Abstract. A non-malleable code protects messages against a class of tampering functions. Informally, a code is non-malleable if the effect of applying any tampering function on an encoded message is to either retain the message or to replace it with an unrelated message. Two main challenges in this area -apart from establishing the feasibility against different families of tampering -are to obtain explicit constructions and to obtain high-rates for such constructions. In this work, we present a compiler to transform low-rate (in fact, zero rate) non-malleable codes against certain class of tampering into an optimal-rate -i.e., rate 1 -non-malleable codes against the same class. If the original code is explicit, so is the new one. When applied to the family of bit-wise tampering functions, this subsumes (and greatly simplifies) a recent result of Cheraghchi and Guruswami (TCC 2014). Further, our compiler can be applied to nonmalleable codes against the class of bit-wise tampering and bit-level permutations. Combined with the rate-0 construction in a companion work, this yields the first explicit rate-1 non-malleable code for this family of tampering functions. Our compiler uses a new technique for boot-strapping non-malleability by introducing errors, that may be of independent interest.
Introduction
Non-Malleable Codes have emerged as an object of fundamental interest, at the intersection of coding theory and cryptography. Informally, a code is nonmalleable if the message contained in a codeword that has been tampered with is either the original message, or a completely unrelated value. As a relatively new problem, several basic questions are still open. In particular, two main challenges in this area -apart from establishing the feasibility against different families of tampering -are to obtain explicit constructions and to obtain high-rates 4 for such constructions.
While existential results have been obtained for rate-1 non-malleable codes for very broad classes of tampering functions [8, 17] , explicit constructions have turned out to be much harder, in such generality. For the relatively simple class of bit-wise tampering functions introduced in [16] , it was only recently that an explicit rate-1 construction was obtained [9] . For the more general class of "splitstate" tampering functions, the first construction in [15] encoded only a single bit; in a break-through result, an explicit scheme (of rate 0) was proposed for arbitrary length messages by [1] , and more recently, a constant rate construction (for 10 states) was provided in [6] .
All the above explicit results relied on the tampering functions being "compartmentalized" -i.e., the codeword is partitioned a priori into separate blocks and each block is tampered independently of the others -In a companion paper [3] , we presented the first instance of an explicit non-malleable code against a class of non-compartmentalized tampering functions. This class consists of functions which can permute the bits of a codeword, as well as tamper each bit independently. Apart from being of interest as a natural non-compartmentalized class, non-malleable codes against this class have direct cryptographic applications: in [3] it is used to obtain non-malleable string-commitments from nonmalleable bit-commitments in a hardware token-based model, with informationtheoretic security (or in the standard model under computational assumptions). This application also highlighted the need for explicit constructions, even if randomized constructions are efficient, since the latter calls for a trusted party to carry out the randomized construction.
The construction in [3] has 0 rate. In this paper, we present a simple but powerful compiler to transform such a non-malleable code into a rate-1 nonmalleable code against the same family. In fact, our compiler is general enough that it can be applied to non-malleable codes against bit-wise tampering too, to improve their rate from 0 to 1. This subsumes (and greatly simplifies) a result of [9] .
Our Contribution
Let F * be the class of tampering functions f : {0, 1} N → {0, 1} N of the form f (x) = f π (f 1 (x 1 ), · · · , f N (x N )), where f π permutes the indices of its input according to a permutation π : [N ] → [N ], and each f i : {0, 1} → {0, 1} is one of the four possible binary functions over {0, 1}.
Our main technical result is the following.
Informal Theorem 1. There exists a black-box compiler that takes a nonmalleable code NMC 0 secure against F * , which may have a polynomial blowup in size during encoding (and hence rate 0), and defines a rate-1 non-malleable code NMC 1 secure against F * . The encoding and decoding algorithms of NMC 1 make only black-box calls to the respective functions of NMC 0 (on much smaller inputs).
In fact, we present our compiler as consisting of two black-box components: NMC 0 and a rate-1 binary error-correcting code. (We require the error-correcting code to also have an easy to satisfy privacy requirement.) The encoding and decoding algorithms of NMC 1 make only black-box calls to the encoding, decoding and error-correcting functions of this error-correcting code. An error-correcting code with the requisite properties is easily instantiated using (low-distance) Reed-Solomon codes over a field of characteristic 2.
Instantiating NMC 0 with the non-malleable code of [3] (which has rate 0, as the codewords are super-linear in the length of the messages), we get our main result.
Corollary 1.
There exists an explicit and efficient rate-1 non-malleable code against F * .
We point out that the above result has immediate implications for the class of all bit-wise tampering functions F BIT [16] . Non-malleable codes for this family has been studied by [16, 9] . We note that F BIT is a subset of F * in which π is restricted to be the identity permutation. As a consequence, we reproduce a result of [9] as a simple corollary to Corollary 1:
There exists an explicit and efficient rate-1 non-malleable code against F BIT .
In fact, Theorem 1 continues to hold true, without altering the compiler, if F * is replaced by F BIT (so that NMC 0 and NMC 1 are both secure only against F BIT ). This provides a much simpler alternative to a compiler in [9] , and proves Corollary 2 without relying on the recent construction from [3] .
Prior Work
Cramer et al. [12] introduced the notion of arithmetic manipulation detection (AMD) codes, which is a special case of non-malleable codes against tampering functions with a simple algebraic structure; explicit AMD codes with optimal (second order) parameters have been recently provided by [13] . Dziembowski et al. motivated and formalized the more general notion of non-malleable codes in [16] . They showed existence of a constant rate non-malleable code against the class of all bit-wise independent tampering functions.
The existence of rate-1 non-malleable codes against various classes of tampering functions is known. For example, existence of such codes with rate (1 − α) was shown against any tampering function family of size 2 2 αn ; but this scheme has inefficient encoding and decoding [8] . For tampering functions of size 2 poly(n) , rate-1 codes (with efficient encoding and decoding) exist, and can be obtained efficiently with overwhelming probability [18] .
However, explicit constructions of non-malleable codes have remained elusive, except for some well structured tampering function classes. For the setting where the codeword is partitioned into separate blocks and each block can be tampered arbitrarily but independently, an encoding scheme was proposed in [10] . In the most general such compartmentalized model of tampering, where there are only two compartments (known as the split-state model), an explicit encoding scheme for bits was proposed by [15] . Recently, in a break-through result, an explicit scheme (of rate 0) was proposed for arbitrary length messages by [1] . A constant rate construction for 10 states was provided in [6] .
In the computational setting, there has been a sequence of works on improving the rate of error-correcting codes [26, 28, 29, 23, 22, 5] and constructing non-malleable codes and its variants [27, 17] .
An explicit rate 1 code for the class of bit-wise independent tampering function was proposed by [9] . Note that a tampering function in this class tampers each bit independently and is subsumed by our work and a companion paper [3] . In the construction of [9] , they exhaustively search for an encoding scheme (which is guaranteed by [18] ) for messages with logarithmic length. This is a complex procedure (and intuitively obscure) and the compiler which extends the nonmalleability to long messages is also complicated. We, on the other hand, begin with a rate 0 code of [3] against a more general class of (non-compartmentalized) tampering functions and apply our compiler to obtain rate 1 non-malleable code against the more general class itself.
We remark that preliminary results leading to this work appear in [2] . The results of this paper and [3] together subsume and significantly extend the results in [2] .
Technical Overview
Improved Efficiency via Hybrid Encoding. A recurring theme in cryptographic constructions for improving efficiency (in our setting, efficiency refers to the rate of the code) is a "boot-strapping" or "hybrid" approach. It takes a scheme with strong security (but low efficiency), and combines it with an efficient scheme (with a weak form of security) to obtain an efficient scheme with strong security. Perhaps the most well-known example of this approach in cryptography is that of "hybrid encryption," which improves the efficiency of a (non-malleable) publickey encryption scheme by using it to encrypt a short key for a symmetric-key encryption scheme, and then using the latter to encrypt the actual message (e.g., see [14, 25] ).
The high-level approach in this work, as well as in many works on improving the rate of error-correcting codes and non-malleable codes [22, 9] , fits this template. A basic idea for non-malleable codes in these works involves encoding the message using a high-rate (randomized) code and appending to it a tag that is encoded using an inefficient non-malleable encoding NMC 0 . That is, the final codeword has the form (c, NMC 0 (τ )), where c is a (malleable) encoding of the message, and τ consists of some information about c that "binds" c to τ .
Intuitively, the short tag τ should encode some information about the much longer c in a way that makes it hard to change c without changing τ as well, and since the latter is encoded using a non-malleable code, one could hope that the over all code is non-malleable. One such choice of the tag, used in a preliminary version of this result [2] , is τ = (h, h(c)), where h is a randomly chosen hash function with a short description from a (statistical) collision-resistant hash function family. As shown in [2] , this suffices for the class of attacks involving permutations (but not allowing the adversary to set/reset the bits). However, when the class of attacks allowed for the adversary includes the possibility of the adversary creating an entirely new tag τ * (and a new purported codeword c obtained by mauling the original codeword c), this approach fails. This is because, it raises the possibility that the adversary can pick h such that h( c) can be predicted with non-negligible probability, even though the adversary may have some uncertainty about c. While it is plausible that most of the functions h in a function family would lead to unpredictable values of h( c), it appears difficult to rule out there being no such h, or to provide an efficient algorithm for detecting them.
Our Approach: Adding Errors for Non-Malleability. We introduce a novel approach to boot-strapping non-malleability. We first motivate our approach using a loose analogy. Consider a student plagiarising a homework solution, by copying it from an original source, and blindly making a few alterations (without actually comprehending the original solution). The student would try to remove various pieces of identifying information (e.g., change variable names, reorder sentences etc.) and even introduce minor typographical errors, while hoping to make it look approximately correct to the grader. If there is not much variability in correct solutions, then, even if confronted with the original solution, the student will have plausible deniability that she came up with the solution on her own. However, if the original source happened to contain several minor random errors itself (which a grader would have recognized as minor, and ignored), then the chances are that many of them would make their way into the plagiarized solution as well. In this case, it will be unlikely that the student could have introduced those errors on her own, and this will be a strong indication of plagiarization.
While our problem of non-malleability is different, our solution follows the above intuition. Our encoding has the form Enc(s) = (ECSS(s) ⊕ e R , NMC 0 (τ )), where now ECSS is a light-weight (rate-1) encoding of s, R is an appropriately sized random subset of indices (say, |R| = n δ bits, where |ECSS(s)| = n), e R is a sparse n-bit vector, with zeros outside of R and uniformly randomly chosen bits in R. The tag τ is a succinct representation of the bits of ECSS(s) ⊕ e R at the positions in R. Note that |τ | is much shorter than n (e.g., O(n δ log n)), so that (for an appropriate choice of δ), NMC 0 (τ ) will be o(n)-bits long. The property we will need from ECSS is that it is an "error-correcting secret-sharing scheme" which is an error-correcting encoding that also behaves as a (ramp) secret-sharing scheme, so that any small subset of the bits in an encoding has values independent of the message it encodes. (Such a code can be readily instantiated using, for example, any linear error-correcting code of appropriate (sub-linear) distance and dual distance.)
To decode (c, σ), the following consistency check is carried out: apply errorcorrection to obtain a codeword c from c; also decode σ using the decoding of NMC 0 to obtain τ ; then ensure that at the locations recorded in τ , c matches the recorded bits, and everywhere else c matches c.
In other words, our encoding amounts to adding random errors to the efficiently encoded messages (while allowing error-correction); further, we require this to be accompanied by an "errata" (encoded using a non-malleable code) which lists all the errors in the first part. Now, intuitively, if the adversary chooses to create an errata on its own, but creates c by tampering c (i.e., using significantly many bits from c), then it is unlikely that the new errata matches c. On the other hand, if the adversary retains the errata from a given codeword, then any significant tampering on c will result in a mismatch; instead, if c is obtained by only lightly tampering c, then, due to the distance of the code the only possibility to obtain a valid encoding is to have c = c, and by a simple privacy requirement on the code, the probability of this happening when only a small number of bits in c are involved, is independent of the message.
Formal Analysis. We present a modular proof that the above construction is indeed a non-malleable code against F * , the family of permutations and bitwise tampering attacks, by relying on the security of NMC 0 as well as the errorcorrection and privacy properties of ECSS in a black-box manner. The proof is somewhat simpler, if instead of considering F * , we considered only F BIT , the family of bit-wise tampering functions, as in [9] (in which case, NMC 0 need be secure only against this class of tampering functions). Below we sketch this simpler proof, and indicate in footnotes the main points of departure for the full proof.
Formally, we need to argue that for any message s and any admissible attack f , for a randomly constructed codeword Enc(s), the outcome of Dec(f (Enc(s))) is almost identically distributed as a simulated outcome which probabilistically maps f to the original message s, a fixed message distribution M f , or ⊥ (with M f and the probabilities depending only on f ). The simulated outcome is defined as follows:
Let L and R denote the set of indices in our code corresponding to c and NMC 0 (τ ), respectively. Given f , we proceed as follows.
-Define attacks f (1) and f (2) obtained by restricting respectively to L and R.
is simply a bit-wise tampering attack on NMC 0 (τ ). By the security guarantee of NMC 0 , we can sample, based only on f (2) (independent of τ ), the outcome of Dec(f (2) (NMC 0 (τ ))) as ⊥, some string τ * , or same
We consider two sub-cases, depending on the number of bits in c that are not fixed by the attack f (1) (i.e., the number of bits that depend on the original bit at that position).
• If the number of bits of c that influence c is "small," then they can be sampled independent of the message s, by relying on the fact that ECSS is a (ramp) secret-sharing scheme. Then the simulated outcome is obtained by error-correcting c , decoding it and checking for consistency with τ * .
• If the number of bits of c that depend on c is not small, then (following the analogy of plagiarism from above), there is an overwhelming probability that this set of bits contain several random bits and the probability that τ * correctly records them is negligible. In this case, the simulated outcome is ⊥.
-Case simulated outcome of Dec(f (2) (NMC 0 (τ ))) is same * : In this case, τ remains unchanged. Again we consider two sub-cases, this time depending on the number of untampered bits in the attack f (1) .
• If there are only a small number of tampered bits in f (1) , then f
(ECSS(s)) results in a valid codeword iff f (1) has the effect of not altering ECSS(s). This depends only on the values of the bits of ECSS(s) which are tampered by f (1) (and τ ), which in turn is independent of the message s, due to ECSS being a secret-sharing scheme. Hence we can sample τ and these bits, independent of s. This is used to simulate the outcome being same * or ⊥.
• On the other hand, if there are several tampered bits, then we simulate the outcome to be ⊥.
To argue that the last step results in only a negligible statistical error, we follow an argument similar to the plagiarism argument, but this time relying on the fact that τ is retained as it is, and will have a record of all the actual errors. Consider the set of bits that were tampered by f (1) . Except with negligible probability, a significant number of bits in this set would have been recorded in τ . For each such bit, the probability that the tampered bit does not match the bit recorded in τ is at least 1 2 (it is 1 if the tampering function is a bit-flip, and 1 2 if it is a set/reset), independent of the other bits. Hence the probability that τ matches all of those bits is negligible.
7 Thus indeed, the outcome of the actual decoding would be ⊥, except with negligible probability.
Preliminaries
We denote the set {1, . . . , n} by [n]. Probability distributions are represented by capital letters. The distribution U S represents a uniform distribution over the set S. Given a distribution X, x ∼ X represents that x is sampled according to the distribution X. We shall often use the convention that a realization of a random variable denoted as X will be represented by the variable x.
For a joint variable X = (X 1 , . . . , X n ) and S = {i 1 , . . . , i |S| } ⊆ [n], we define the random variable X S = (X i1 , . . . , X i |S| ), where |S| denotes the size of the set S. We use a similar notation for vectors as well, for example x S represents the vector restricted to indices in the set S. For a function f (·), the random variable Y = f (X) represents the following distribution: sample x ∼ X and output f (x). For a randomized algorithm A, we write A(z) to denote the distribution of the output of A on an input z.
The statistical distance between two distributions S and T over a finite sample space I is defined as:
The hamming distance between two vectors c, c ∈ {0, 1} m is given by
7 When we allow permutations, some amount of correlation can exist between the different tampered bits. For example, if two bits that are recorded got swapped with each other, the probability of not having an error is 1 2 and not 1 4 . But this is the most extreme example: if k bits recorded in τ have been tampered with, we show that the error probability is at least 1 − (
A function f : N → R + is negligible if for every positive polynomial poly(·) and all sufficiently large n, f (n) 1/poly(n). We use negl(M ) to denote an (unspecified) negligible function in M .
Lastly, all logarithms in this paper would be to the base 2.
Classes of Tampering Functions
We shall consider the following basic tampering function classes. 
These functions are, respectively, called forward, toggle, reset and set functions.
We define a more complex tampering function class F BIT • S N to consist of tampering functions of the form f = (f 1 , . . . , f N , π), where π ∈ S N and f i ∈ F BIT , and
That is, to apply f to x, first we apply f i to each position x i , and apply the permutation π to the resulting string. Our main result provides an efficient rate-1 non-malleable code against this class.
Error-Correcting Secret-Sharing Scheme
In this section, we define error-correcting secret-sharing schemes that will be used in our construction.
Definition 1 (Error-Correcting Secret-Sharing Scheme (ECSS)). Let S = (X 0 , X 1 , . . . , X M ) be a joint distribution over Λ × {0, 1}
M , such that the support of X 0 is all of Λ. (The random variable X 0 represents the secret being shared and X i for i ∈ [M ] represents the i-th share.)
We say that S is an [M, L, T, D]-error-correcting secret-sharing scheme if log |Λ| = L, and the following conditions hold: 3. Reconstruction: For any s, s ∈ Λ such that s = s , we have
In the remainder of the paper, by an ECSS scheme, we shall implicitly refer to a family of ECSS schemes indexed by M , i.e., [M, L(M ), T (M ), D(M )]-ECSS schemes for each positive integer M . We define the rate of such a scheme to be lim M →∞
L(M )
M . We will be interested in efficient ECSS schemes. For this, we define three algorithms associated with such a scheme.
-Enc ECSS (s): This is a randomized algorithm that takes s ∈ Λ as input and outputs a sample from the distribution (X Note that the uniqueness of the output of algorithms ECorr ECSS and Rec ECSS is guaranteed by the D-error-correction and reconstruction properties respectively. An ECSS scheme is said to be efficient if the three algorithms defined above run in time bounded by a polynomial in M .
Non-malleable codes
In Fig. 1 we present the definition of an [N, L, ν]-non-malleable code against a family of tampering functions F.
Concentration Bound
The following concentration bound will be useful in our proof. Below, we write
Lemma 1 (Tail Inequality for Hypergeometric Distribution [24, 11] ). Let c ∈ (0, 1/2) be a constant, m, n ∈ N and m ∈ [cn, (1 − c)n]. Let X be a random variable distributed uniformly over all n-bit strings with exactly m 1s. For every t ∈ N, we have
where
Let F be a set of functions of the form f : {0, 1} N → {0, 1} N . Consider two mappings Enc : {0, 1} L → {0, 1} N (possibly randomized) and Dec : {0,
For f ∈ F and s ∈ {0, 1} L , define a random variable Tamper
Tamper
Let Sim be a map from F to distributions over the sample space {0, 1} L ∪ {same * , ⊥}.
For f ∈ F and s ∈ {0, 1} L , define the random variable Copy Sim(f ) as follows.
The simulation error (or, advantage) is defined to be:
-non-malleable code against F if the following conditions hold:
We say that the coding scheme is efficient if Enc and Dec run in time bounded by a polynomial in N . 
Further, if NMC 0 and ECSS are efficient, then NMC 1 is also efficient. (1)), then the code is a rate-1 code. Also, poly(N ) < N − M < N , and hence if ν 0 is a negligible function, so is ν 1 .
Our compiler is described in Fig. 2 . When properly instantiated (see Section 3.2) we can obtain our main results Corollary 1 and Corollary 2.
Discussion. Note that our compiler is a fully black-box compiler, in that both the components are used in fully black-box manner and the security of our compiler 
and B = 2peN (1) . Sample a random subset (2) ) as the codeword.
Dec(c ∈ {0, 1} N ):
1. Interpretc as (c (1) ,c (2) ) of length N (1) and N (2) , respectively. 2. Let τ * = Dec NMC 0 (c (2) ). 
Proof of Main Theorem
To achieve the parameters stated in the proof, we shall use the following parameters in our construction in Fig. 2 :
. From the construction, we get |τ | B(log M + 1) = 2p e M log 2M . Using this we get, N (2) |τ |
We shall interpret the codeword produced by Fig. 2 as a two-part codeword. The left-part is a share-packing based on the ECSS and the right-part has the non-malleable encoding of τ using NMC 0 . For ease of notation, let L = [N (1) ] and
Consider the [t , t, ν 0 ] non-malleable coding scheme NMC 0 against F = F BIT • S t with encoding and decoding algorithms Enc NMC0 and Dec NMC0 respectively. For τ ∈ {0, 1} t and f ∈ F , the random variable Tamper
f ,NMC0 over {0, 1} t ∪{⊥} with respect NMC 0 is given by
The non-malleability of NMC 0 guarantees that there exists a map Sim 0 from F to distributions over the sample space {0, 1} t ∪ {same * , ⊥} such that SD Tamper
for all τ ∈ {0, 1} t and f ∈ F . See Fig. 1 for the definition of non-malleable codes. We use an additional subscript in the notation of Tamper function to distinguish it from the one we define below for NMC 1 .
Fix a tampering function f = (f 1 , . . . , f N , π) ∈ F * = F BIT •S N and a message s. The random variable Tamper
f,NMC1 over {0, 1} L ∪ {⊥} for the non-malleable coding scheme NMC 1 described in Fig. 2 (with encoding and decoding functions Enc and Dec respectively) is given by
Our goal is to show that there exists a map Sim 1 from F * to distributions over the sample space {0, 1} L ∪ {same * , ⊥} such that SD Tamper
(It is easy to see that NMC 1 is correct.) We provide a description of Sim 1 in the next section and show that Copy
is statistically close to Tamper
f,NMC1 after that.
Description of simulator Given f = (f 1 , . . . , f N , π) ∈ F * , we define the following set of indices in [N ] which will be used in the description of the simulator (and later in the proof):
-Let X ⊆ L be the set of all indices which move from left to right as a result of applying the permutation π, i.e., X = {i ∈ L | π(i) ∈ R}. -Similarly, let Y = {i ∈ R | π(i) ∈ L} be the indices which move from right to left. Note that |X| = |Y |.
-Let X = L \ X.
-Let J ⊆ X such that for all i ∈ J, f i ∈ {f forward , f toggle }. In other words, J is the set of all indices on the left which are mapped into the left codeword using f forward or f toggle .
In other words, V denotes the set of indices on the left which are not tampered.
Observe that only the bits at indices X in c (1) affect the tampered right codewordc (2) . Hence, given c
X , we can construct a tampering function f (2) ∈ F BIT • S t which acts on the right codeword. Let ρ : Y → X be an arbitrary bijection from Y to X. The function f (2) = (f
N (2) , π (2) ) is given by
for i ∈ R. Let D ECSS be the distribution of Enc ECSS (s ) for a random s ∈ {0, 1} L . We are now ready to describe how the distribution Sim 1 (f ) is generated:
(1) Set τ , c
(1) X and f (2) as follows: First sample E as described in Step 1 of Fig. 2 . Let τ = (E, r) where r ∼ U {0,1} B (i.e., r is a random bit-string of length B). The bits in r are indexed by the indices in E. Also, sample a (1) ∼ D ECSS . Together τ and a (1) is used to determine c (1)
X , as described in Equation 1. (If the number of error indices in X, i.e. |X ∩ E|, is larger than O(log 2 M ), output ⊥ and stop. Using Lemma 1, we can show that this happens with only negl(M ) probability.)
If no such codeword exists, then the simulator fails. (4) θ obtained in Step 2 could be an element in {0, 1} t , same * or ⊥. Let Event fix , Event same * and Event ⊥ denote the corresponding events. Do the following based on which event takes place: (a) Case Event ⊥ : Output ⊥ and stop. X using a (1) , r from Step
V as well: i.e., for i ∈ V , define c
(1) i = r i . Combined with c (2) defined in the previous step, this defines a uniquec
Output same * ifc
(1)
V ∪X , else output ⊥.
Hybrids and their indistinguishability
Recall that we want to show that the distributions Tamper Sim1(f ) are statistically close to each other. Towards this, we first define four intermediate hybrids, (described below, and summarized, for quick reference, in Fig. 3) , and show that for every f ∈ F * and s ∈ {0, 1} L ,
Case Event fix :
We have the following two cases based on |J|. Recall that J = {i ∈ L | π(i) ∈ L and f i ∈ {f forward , f toggle }}.
-Case |J| > α: In this case, we show that Pr[Hyb3
X ). First, we define some notation. Let Z ⊆ L be set of indices i ∈ L such that π −1 (i) ∈ R, i.e., Z is the set of indices on the left which come from the right. Let τ * = (E * , r * ), where the bits in r * are indexed by the indices in E * . (We know that τ * ∈ {0, 1} t since θ ∈ {0, 1} t ). Let F τ be the indices i ∈ L such that π(j) = i and j ∈ E, i.e., j is an erroneous index according to original tag τ . Fix any ECSS codeword a (1) for the left consistent with c
X . We first show that, irrespective of the value of τ , there exists at most one ECSS codeword a * such that the tampered left codewordc (1) is consistent with a * and τ * . More precisely, for any two possible values of τ -τ 1 and τ 2 -letĉ τ1 andĉ τ2 be the corresponding values ofc (1) . Suppose Dec 
where we used the fact that, sinceĉ τ1 L\Z andĉ τ2 L\Z are derived from the same value of a (1) by adding at most B errors each, followed by applying a tampering function that cannot increase the hamming distance, their hamming distance is at most 2B, and |Z| N (2) . By the choice of our parameters, 3B + N (2) D, as required. Thus, Hyb3
(1) ) = a * , for a value a * which is fixed independent of τ . Further, since τ * = (E * , r * ) is fixed, there is a unique c * as in the description of Dec * in Fig. 2 , and it must be the case thatc (1) = c * . Next, we show that over randomness of τ (conditioned on a (1) , c
X ), the probability that tampered codewordc (1) = c * is negligible in M . Over randomness of τ , we know that number of error indices in J w.r.t. τ are Ω(log 2 M ) with 1 − negl(M ) probability (see Lemma 1 and recall that the number of error indices in X is only O(log 2 M )). Let these error indices be G. Note that for a random τ , the value of erroneous indices outside X is uniform. This implies that each bit in c (1) G is independent uniform bit (even after fixing
X and all other bits of c
G ). Moreover, by definition of set J, for any i ∈ G, we have π(i) ∈ L (since J ∩ X = ∅) and the bitc π(j) = c * π(j) for j ∈ G \ {i}. Therefore, probability thatc
-Case |J| α: In this case, Copy J (rest of c (1) is not important).
In the former case, c
J is sampled from D ECSS (conditioned on c
X ), while in the latter case it is sampled from Enc ECSS (s) (again conditioned on c (1) X ). This, however, makes no difference because T , the privacy parameter of ECSS, is at least N (2) + α |X| + |J|.
3. Case Event same * : Since θ = same * , we know that τ * = τ . We have the following two cases based on n non-id = |V |.
-Case n non-id > β: In this case, we show that Pr[Hyb3
over a random choice of τ = (E, r) (conditioned on c
X ). In fact, we will show that for any ECSS codeword a (1) for the left (consistent with c X . Rest of the analysis will be over the randomness of τ , conditioned on c
X and a (1) . Recall that while sampling τ in Step 1, we begin by sampling a random set of error indices E. We consider the size of the set V ∩ E \ Z, where Z = {i ∈ L|π −1 (i) ∈ R}. Over the random choice of E, we have |V ∩E \Z| = Ω(log 2 M ) with 1−negl(M ) probability. This follows from Lemma 1, because
and the number of error indices in X is only O(log 2 M ). We identify a set U ⊆ V ∩E\Z, such that |U | |V ∩E\Z|/2 and for each i ∈ U , Pr[c
i ] 1/2, even conditioned onc
i , for any set of i ∈ U \ {i}. We build U iteratively: initialize U = ∅ and W = V ∩ E \ Z. Pick any index i ∈ W , and let j = π −1 (i). Update U to U ∪ {i} and W to W \ {i, j}, and repeat this until W is empty. Clearly, |U | |V ∩ E \ Z|/2. To verify the other property of U , note that at any step, when we pick i ∈ W , and let j = π −1 (i), we have either 1)
is uniformly random and hence Pr[c negl(M ). But to be a valid left codeword, it has to be the case thatc We know that most of the indices on the left have been copied identically to the tampered codeword. We use this to argue that if the tampered codewordc (1) is valid w.r.t. τ thenc (1) = c (1) , and that the probability of this happening depends only on a small number of bits in c (1) and hence independent of the message s. More formally, we have the following. Let a (1) be an ECSS encoding of s consistent with c
X . The maximum number of errors in the tampered codewordc (1) could be |V |+|X|+|E| β +N (2) + 2p e N (1) D, where D is the error-correction radius of the ECSS code. Hence, a * = ECorr ECSS (c (1) ), computed in the algorithm Dec * by Hyb3
f , must be equal to a (1) . Further, since τ * = τ , c * = c (1) . Therefore, unless c (1) =c (1) , the output of Hyb3 V ∪X . This is the exact check which Sim 1 performs, by sampling c f , since the privacy parameter T of ECSS is at least N (2) + β |X| + |V |. Hence, in this case, Sim 1 outputs same * with the same probability as Hyb3
(s) f = s; otherwise, both the random variables are ⊥. This completes the proof.
Instantiations
We shall use the following results:
1. There exists a [t , t, ν 0 ] non-malleable code NMC 0 against F BIT • S t , where t t · polylog t and ν 0 (·) is a suitable negligible function. This follows from the work of [3] . For simplicity, we set d = 2 so that we have t < t d . 2. Using Shamir's secret-sharing scheme [30] , with a standard share-packing technique [4, 19] , we can obtain an efficient [M, L, T, D] ECSS such that: M = nϕ, L = ϕ and T = D = (n − )/2, where ϕ = 2 log n. We can choose n − = n 3/4 so that T, D = Θ(M 3/4 ) 2M d/(d+1) log 2d M , for d = 2. The secret sharing scheme is formally described as follows. We choose a field F of characteristic 2 such that ϕ = |F| n 2 . Pick arbitrary elements in the field F and name them S = {− , . . . , −1, 1, . . . , n}. The secret sharing scheme is constructed by picking a random + (n − )/2 degree polynomial p(·) and evaluating it at elements in S. The share X 0 is the concatenation of the evaluations of p(·) at {− , . . . , −1} and interpreting it as a binary string. The share X i , for i ∈ [M ], is the ith bit in the concatenation of evaluations of p(·) at {1, . . . , n}. Note that we can also use Algebraic Geometric code [21, 20] based sharepacking techniques [7] over constant size field with characteristic 2. But we forgo this optimization for ease of presentation and simplicity of the resulting code.
Using the above choices for NMC 0 and ECSS, we get the following rate of NMC 1 in Theorem 1.
This directly yields Corollary 1 and Corollary 2.
